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Still standing: how European firms weathered the crisis
The third EFIGE policy report
What impact has the Great Recession had on European firms? In 2008 and
2009, the European Union experienced a 14 percent decline in industrial
production, and a 15 percent decline in trade. Companies were hit hard, going
through an average 10 percent sales decline, and reducing their workforces
by 6 percent.
But the unique firm-level dataset compiled from the EFIGE survey shows that
not all firms were affected in the same way. Exporters contracted more than
non-exporters, while importers, and those that outsource some of their
production or have an affiliate suffered less of a decline. These findings raise
an important policy trade-off. While export-oriented strategies might improve
competitiveness, they also bring about a greater exposure to foreign crises.
However, outsourcing to other countries has distinct stabilisation benefits.
Dominant firms centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership net-
work, fared better, but firms relying on external finance, and experiencing
financial constraints to growth, experienced greater sales declines.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) is a project to examine the pat-
tern of internationalisation of European firms. The research leading to this
report has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework
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arising from the project (European Firms in a Global Economy) are in the process of








Internationalisation, however, also makes ﬁrms vulnerable to shocks aﬀecting
international trade and may transform them into agents of propagation of global
downturns.AtthetimeoftheGreatRecessionof2009,therewasintensespeculation
about the reasons why trade collapsed much more than output. It was sometimes






a minority of ﬁrms managed to fare very well in spite of headwinds, and that their
individualcharacteristicsandtheirpositioninglobalsupplychainsbothplayedmajor
rolesindeterminingtheirperformanceandtheiremploymentbehaviour.Thisﬁnding
is reminiscent of a familiar insight from the analysis of labour markets: even in the






ﬁndings. Throughout Europe and beyond, governments are putting increased
emphasis on competitiveness and growth. But eﬀective policies require a proper
understandingofwhatdeterminesinternationalperformance.Thisespeciallyapplies
tosouthernEuropeancountries,wherethetraded-goodssectorshasshrunkinrelative






in international markets to expand their reach, would do more for competitiveness
thanacross-the-board,indiscriminatemeasures.Thisshouldnotbeanargumentfor
‘pickingthewinners’,rathertoﬁndwaystohelp‘fattenthetail’ofgloballycompetitive
ﬁrms. How to achieve this goal in a non-discretionary, non-distortive way is what
economicresearchshouldnowhelpshedlighton.













by 13.7 and 15 percent, respectively. The unemployment rate peaked at just below
10percentattheendof2009.Businesses,policymakersandacademicsalikewould
like to understand the causes and the consequences of the crisis, with the hope of
avoidingormitigatingfutureones.
ThisreportaskshowtheGreatRecessionimpactedEuropeanﬁrms.Inaddressingthis
question, we rely on the EFIGE survey, which asked a total of 14,444 ﬁrms in seven
countriesabouttheirperformance,theirmodesofinternationalisation,theiremploy-
ment decisions, their ﬁnancing structure and their competitive environment, among
other topics1. The countries covered were Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
SpainandtheUnitedKingdom.Thecountriesdiﬀermarkedlynotonlyintheireconomic







The survey shows that these averages disguise signiﬁcant heterogeneity across
countriesandﬁrmsintermsofhowtheywereaﬀectedby,orrespondedto,thecrisis.
Despiteasynchronised,substantialmacro-economicshock,theresponseofﬁrmswas











which workers were laid oﬀ, there were more lay-oﬀs at ﬁrms with many part-time
employeesandmanyunskilledworkers.Thissuggeststhatduringcrisesﬁrmstryto
protect the human capital embodied in skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers,
whilesometypesofworkersareseenasmoreeasilyreplaceableshouldtherecovery
arrive.
Exporters contracted more than non-exporters. The average exporter suﬀered a 3.2
percentage points greater decline in sales than the average non-exporter within the
same country. However, some of this diﬀerence boils down to structural diﬀerences
between countries. When controlling for industry and size class, this diﬀerence is
reduced to 2.5 percentage points. The diﬀerence in the sales decline between
exportersandnon-exporterswasgreatestinAustria,GermanyandFrance.
Oneﬁrm’sexportsareanotherﬁrm’simports.Dotradelinkagesexacerbatethecrisis
or do they just transmit shocks from one country to another? Our next result is that
importers and ﬁrms that outsourced some of their production were somewhat
insulated from the shock of the crisis. The revenues of importers declined by 0.8
percentagepointslessthanthoseofnon-importersinthesamecountry,industryand
sizecategory.
Taken together, it becomes clear that international trade is important in the trans-
mission of the crisis, but some trade linkages may enable the ﬁrm to respond more
ﬂexiblytodemandshocks.Thisﬁndingraisesthepossibilityofadditionalgainsfrom
tradeandglobalisationincoreEuropeancountries.Well-establishedanddeeplinkages







up to an extra 4.2 percent. This suggests that the place of the ﬁrm in the production
chainisanimportantdeterminantoftheeﬀectofthecrisis.Wealsoconﬁrmthisﬁnding
with technological indices: industries that sell mostly to other industries have
contractedmore.
Given the ﬁnancial nature of the crisis, it is natural to look at how ﬁrms in diﬀerent
ﬁnancial positions fared. Based on the survey, ﬁrms with self-reported ﬁnancial
constraints contracted more during the crisis. Because the survey questions were
retrospective (ﬁrms were asked in late 2009/early 2010 about perceived ﬁnancial
constraints in 2008), it is diﬃcult to establish a causal relationship between these
ﬁnancial indicators and performance. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in industries
withagreaterrelianceoncollateralisedpropertycontractedmore.






centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership network, fared better. Firms
producingﬁnalgoods,non-clientspeciﬁcgoodsandrelyingonastablepoolofskilled







1. Despite a synchronised, substantial macro-economic shock, ﬁrms’ responses









(before the crisis) experienced greater sales declines. Firms with greater pre-














growth. This report is diﬀerent because it asks how the Great Recession impacted





policy responses that were implemented in the midst of the crisis with limited
informationaboutthescopeandnatureoftheevents.Identifyingﬁrmsthatfaredbetter
mayhelpdesignmoreeﬀectiveandbetter-targetedpolicies.
In addressing these questions, we rely on the EFIGE survey, which asked a total of
14,444 ﬁrms in seven countries about their performance, their modes of inter-
nationalisation, their employment decisions, their ﬁnancing structure and their
competitive environment, among other topics. The countries covered were Austria,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Data was collected
in2010andisrepresentativeofmanufacturingsectorsineachcountry.Thecountries
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theheterogeneityofresponsesinspiteofasynchronizedshock.Wethenlookatthe





For each issue, we ﬁrst note the key results to date, set out some hypotheses and






nose-dived in October 2008, reaching a record decline of 37 percent in April 2009.




between October 2008 and June 2009 was 25 percent with countries experiencing
very strong concurrent drops in trade. With very few exceptions, OECD countries









per ﬁrm (intensive margin). This is relevant for policy as these two margins can be




at the intensive margin (ﬁrst half of 2008 versus ﬁrst half of 2009). The intensive
margin fall was evenly spread across products. Almost all trading ﬁrms remained
active,withhardlyanychangeintheaveragenumberofcountriestheytradedwith.It




durables and capital goods in the intensive-margin decline. The same applies to
destination and origin markets: though the fall was slightly less pronounced for EU
partners and/or higher-growth countries, domestic sales and purchases fell equally
fastwithnosystematicvariationacrossﬁrms.










gesting that exports are about two to three times more volatile than GDP, owing to a
relativelylargershareofdurables(EngelandWang,2011).
Looking at 450 items at NAICS 6-digit industry level quarterly data for the US3,




ﬁnancial crisis hit European banks and markets in late 2008. On average, sales
dropped by over 12 percent4. Exports declined marginally less in the sample – 11.6
percent – and the recession was accompanied by a 6.2 percent fall in employment.
Motivatedbythepreviousﬁndings,theEFIGEsurveyprovidesanopportunitytolook
inmoredetailintotheheterogeneityofﬁrm’sreactionstothissimultaneouscrisis.As











for ﬁrms in Austria, Germany and in the UK, the collapse of both sales and exports
remainedbelowninepercent,whilefortheothercountriesitwasmorethan12percent.
The gap between the sales and export declines is rather diﬀerent across countries,
withthegapclosetozeroinAustria,GermanyandItaly,whileforSpainandtheUKthe














consider the diversity of responses regarding sales. This diversity is present both
within countries and industries. The average sales decline of 12.2 percent masks a























variation. The remainder is a consequence of ﬁrm heterogeneity. For percentage
changeinexports,thesefeaturesexplain4.5percentofvariationonly.
Manyﬁrmswereabletopreventtheirsalesfromfallingevenincountriessuﬀeringa
great contraction, and, conversely, there were several ﬁrms facing a decline even in
economiesfaringrelativelywell(seeFigure3).Largedeclinesweremostfrequently
experienced in Spain, while over a third of ﬁrms in Austria, Germany and the UK
experiencedstableorrisingsales.Intermsofindustries,theshareofﬁrmsavoidinga









In line with earlier ﬁndings, the data suggests strongly that the reaction on the
extensive margin was relatively small: 179 ﬁrms (2 percent of exporters in 2009)
reportedthattheyexportedpreviously,butnotin2009.Thereactionontheintensive
margin, however, was much larger: exporting ﬁrms reduced their turnover by 11.6
percent,whichissimilarinmagnitudetothedeclineinsales.Thisadjustmentonthe














18 percent of ﬁrms were able to sustain or even increase their sales even in the
worst-hitindustries(metalproducts)andcountries(Spain),respectively.3 Employmentadjustments
Firmsadjustedtheiremploymenttothedeclineindemanddiﬀerently.Inthissection
we aim to understand how big this diﬀerence is and what explains it. Unfortunately
weseeonlytheﬁrstphaseofthecrisisandourdatadoesnotallowustoprovidean
answertowhathappenstolaid-oﬀworkerswhentherecoverycomes.
Firms have reduced their employment to a signiﬁcantly smaller extent than the
average fall in their sales. We explore this relationship by tabulating the decrease in
employmentandthedecreaseinsales(seeTable2).Thedisproportionatepresence
of ﬁrms below the diagonal demonstrates that in proportional terms the majority of







ﬁrm-level characteristics may strongly aﬀect how much of the demand shock is











30% Total reduction reduction
reduction
Nochange 24.2% 2.9% 1.2% 0.2% 28.4%
Changein
0-10%reduction 11.9% 4.7% 2.1% 0.3% 19.1%
sales
10-30%reduction 14.3% 10.0% 8.6% 1.4% 34.4%
Morethan30%reduction 5.1% 3.8% 5.9% 3.3% 18.2%
Total 55.6% 21.5% 17.8% 5.2% 100.0%
Source:EFIGE.
To study the heterogeneity of adjustment, we compare ﬁrms in the same industry
facingasimilarfallindemand(proxiedbythedeclineinsales–seeTable3forresults).





We also address the question of the composition of employment, which may aﬀect





The role of short-time work (STW) has been extensively analysed by several authors.
BoeriandBruecker(2011)presentthecaseforshort-timeworkinEuropearguingthat
intherightinstitutionalsettingssuchmeasuresmayindeeddampentheeﬀectsofcrises.
Indeed OECD data suggests that such measures may have helped create a greater
adjustmentattheintensivemarginbothcomparedtopeersandtopreviouscrises7.
7. ForOECDcountries,BoeriandBruecker(2011)ﬁndthatSTWcontributestoreducingjoblossesespeciallywhen
output falls markedly (at least 2.6 percent) – which is the case for most countries in 2009. Micro-evidence for
GermanyalsoconﬁrmsthepotentialbeneﬁtsofSTW.Whilethelargedeadweightcostsdetectedmaymodifypolicy




Before the crisis, access to short-term work (STW) schemes was largely limited to
workers with open-ended contracts or did not exist at all in some countries. As a
responsetothecrisistherewastheintroductionof(new)publicly-sponsoredSTW,
increasedgenerosity,extendedconditionsofparticipation,extendedduration,and
introduction of training incentives. As detailed by Arpaia et al (2010), many EU







result in a crisis having greater short-term impact. In Denmark, employment
adjustmentisnotparticularlylargebyinternationalcomparison,butitisfocusedon
theextensive(numberofemployees),ratherthanontheintensive(hours)margin.
The results suggest the following conclusions. First, the decline in employment was
smaller than the decline in sales in each country. On average, a large (more than 30
percent) decline in sales is associated with 17.4 percent decline in employment
relativetoﬁrmswithstagnantorincreasingsales.Thenumbersare4.7and9.2percent
for ﬁrms facing sales declines of 0-10 and 10-30 percent, respectively. This









declineintheirsales.the overall employment by 0.19 percent on average. There are, however, some
diﬀerences across countries: skilled blue-collar workers were spared from layoﬀs in
Germany and Hungary, while ﬁrms with more white-collar workers reduced the
employmentleveltoalesserextentinHungaryandItaly.
Fourth, the share of part-time workers is negatively associated with employment






The relationship between the presence of part-time workers and layoﬀs requires
somewhatdeeperanalysis.Thediﬀerencebetweenﬁrmsemployingpart-timeworkers
andﬁrmsnotemployingpart-timeworkersbysales-declinecategoriesispresentedin
Figure 5. While the employment change for the two kinds of ﬁrms is similar for ﬁrms
with stagnating or increasing sales, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for ﬁrms with








Allfirms Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK
Part-time -0.047*** -0.002 0.028 -0.026 -0.013 -0.054 -0.082*** -0.003
employees(%) (0.011) (0.068) (0.04) (0.022) (0.058) (0.044) (0.018) (0.034)
Shareofskilled 0.006 -0.013 0.005 0.024* 0.082** -0.001 -0.002 0.009
bluecollars(%) (0.005) (0.041) (0.014) (0.013) (0.034) (0.012) (0.01) (0.013)
Shareofwhite 0.019*** 0.037 -0.006 0.021 0.082* 0.065*** 0.035 0.003
collars& (0.007) (0.039) (0.016) (0.013) (0.044) (0.02) (0.025) (0.02)
executives(%)
Reductioninsales -17.4*** -24.353*** -18.333*** -16.892*** -15.708*** -14.051*** -20.024*** -19.888***
morethan30% (0.396) (2.81) (0.933) (0.821) (2.302) (0.879) (0.975) (1.121)
Reductioninsales -9.199*** -10.929*** -10.123*** -8.211*** -10.801*** -6.651*** -10.932*** -12.88***
upto10-30% (0.326) (2.08) (0.716) (0.654) (1.923) (0.749) (0.881) (0.841)
Reductioninsales -4.75*** -10.955*** -5.364*** -4.688*** -3.642 -3.888*** -5.59*** -5.211***
upto10% (0.361) (2.295) (0.865) (0.643) (2.33) (0.851) (1.011) (0.947)
Observations 11375 238 1979 2365 360 2274 2289 1870
R2 0.216 0.387 0.258 0.214 0.316 0.153 0.260 0.233
Dummies
Sector,country,
Sector,size Sector,size Sector,size Sector,size Sector,size Sector,size Sector,size
size
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Source:EFIGE.Notes:Standarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
Observationsareweightedbythesamplingweightsoffirms.














more rapid transmission of shocks. In country- and industry-level data, this
transmissionhasbeenconﬁrmedbyOlivieraMartinsandAraujo(2009)andBemset
al (2010), who found that global trade collapsed during the crisis in a simultaneous
manneracrosscountries.Thereareseveralstudies(egBehrensetal,2010;Bricongne




Alessandria et al (2010) looked at the motor vehicles trade in the US with aggregate
and microdata for trade and inventories. In this sector, international trade declined
moredrasticallythantrade-weightedproductionorabsorption(dropintradewasfour
timesthedropinoutputand50percentgreaterthanthedropinindustrialproduction
or trade-weighted demand) and inventory dynamics showed a sizable adjustment,
especially for imported goods. Given the overshooting nature of inventory manage-
ment, both output and trade are more responsive to shocks and are volatile when
inventories are important – a key issue for motor manufacturers. Trade is aﬀected
relatively more than output because importers hold more inventory than non-
importers.
Motivatedbythesepreviousstudies,welookatthesalesdeclineexperiencedbyﬁrms
that are exporters, and contrast it to the dynamics of non-exporting ﬁrms. Exporter
status is identiﬁed through a question asking whether the ﬁrm exported some of its
outputin2008.
Firstwerelatethechangeoftotalsalestotheexporterstatus(seetheﬁrstcolumnof






but are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally we look at the eﬀect of these all
trade status characteristics in the same time (column 4 of Table 4). We ﬁnd that
exporters‘salesdeclinedsigniﬁcantlymorethannon-exporters(2.5percent)andthat
intermediateimportersfaredsomewhatbetterthannon-importers.Thosethatimport











Observations 14,413 14,412 14,412 14,412
Fixedeffects Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector,
country,size country,size country,size country,size
Model Intervalregression Intervalregression Intervalregression Intervalregression
Source:EFIGE.Notes:Standarderrorsinparantheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
Observationsareweightedbythesamplingweightsoffirms.
Trade fell by more than GDP during the crisis. Manufacturing output and exports
collapsedastheshockcausedconsumersandﬁrmstoretrench;privatedemandfor
alltypesofconsumptionbeyondeverydayusecrashed.Thehugegapbetweentrade





Fact 3 – Exporters contracted more than non-exporters, while importers suﬀered
somewhatlessofadecline.EFIGEREPORTIIITrADEANDCrISISTrANSmISSIoN
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ﬁnd that exporters‘ sales declined signiﬁcantly more than non-exporters in Austria,
France,GermanyandItaly,butnotinHungary,SpainandtheUK.Oneinterpretationof
this pattern is that in Hungary, Spain and the UK, there was signiﬁcant domestic
economicdisturbance,andnon-exporterssuﬀeredtoasimilarorevengreaterextent
thanexporters.Obviously,thispatternwasaﬀectedbydiﬀerentmacroshocks–asfor










While much of the trade collapse was a result of falling ﬁnal demand, imported
intermediategoodsintensiﬁedthedecline,suggestingthatinternationallinkagesvia
the import of intermediate goods inﬂuenced each country’s exposure to foreign
shocks.Theverticalspecialisationtransmissionmechanismissubtle,valuechains–
both national and international – are complex and there are several ways in which
theselinkagescouldgenerateasigniﬁcantandwidespreadcollapseintrade.Thestory





source their output from more countries, their output may be more stable due to
‘diversiﬁcationthroughtrade’.
Theotherhypothesisisthatverticallinkagesmaymagnify,notjusttransmit,shocks
across countries. Using a global input-output framework that links demand to
productionviatradeﬂows,Bemsetal(2010)arguethatasaresultofverticallinkages,
world trade declines by three percent when GDP falls by one percent. This argument
suggeststhatthedemandalone(vialinkages)canaccountfor70percentofthetrade
collapse.
In order to understand the details of this mechanism, and to quantify the conse-
quences of intermediate-goods import linkages for the transmission of shocks and
collapse in trade, one option is to measure bilateral imported intermediate-goods
linkagesusingtradedatacombinedwithnationalinput-outputtables.Levchenkoetal
(2010) used a set of upstream and downstream linkage variables developed in diEFIGEREPORTIIISuPPlyChAINSANDThECrISIS
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intermediates in its production or if it outsources some of its production, it may be
betterequippedto‘unload‘thedemandshocksitfaces.Weanticipatethattheseﬁrms
declinedless10.




To measure input-output linkages of the ﬁrm, we follow di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2010).Weﬁrstcalculatethefractionofsectoraloutputthatisusedasanintermediate
input in other sectors (computed based on national input-output tables). The
complementary share is going to ﬁnal consumers. We also measure the share of
industryrevenuespentonintermediateinputs.
We measure the link between the sales change and the ﬁrm’s share of turnover
produced to order, the outsourcing of some of its production, the industry-level
measure of the share of output used as intermediate of other domestic sectors and
9. Intermsoftheeﬀectofarm’slengthtradeandoﬀshoring,theevidenceisscarcesofar.Bernardetal(2009)look
at the Asian crisis and US exports and ﬁnds that the 1998 decline in arm’s length exports (26 percent) was
substantiallygreaterthanthedropintradeundertakenwithinsupplychains(4percent).AltomonteandOttaviano
(2009)arguethatwithin-ﬁrmeﬀectsaremoremoderategiventhelackofliquidityproblems.Berginetal(2010)




of ﬂuctuations, downstream ﬁrms may be more vulnerable. See Costinot et al (2011) for a productivity-shock
driventheoryofglobalsupplychains.intermediateusageasashareofoutput(seeTable5).Theﬁrsttwoindicatorscapture
variouswaysoforganisingproduction,thelasttwocontrolforthetechnologicalplace
of the ﬁrm in the supply chain. First we assess these four links separately each and














Observations 14,409 14,413 14,409 14,409 14,405
Fixedeffects Sector,, Sector,, Sector,, Sector,, Sector,
country,size country,size country,size country,size country,size
Model Interval Interval Interval Interval Interval
regression regression regression regression regression
Source:EFIGE.Notes:Standarderrorsinparantheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
Observationsareweightedbythesamplingweightsoffirms.
Firms that produce a greater share of their output to order witness a greater drop in
theirsales(seecolumn1ofTable5).Aﬁrmthatproduces100percentofitsoutputto
ordersuﬀereda2.2percentlargerdeclineinsales.Wealsoﬁndthatﬁrmsoutsourcing
part of their production saw smaller declines in their sales during the crisis (Table 5,
column2).Thediﬀerenceis1.8percentagepoints.
Theeﬀectofinput-outputlinkagesismeasuredatthecountry/industrylevelandwe
control for both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimates rely on variation
across countries within the same sector. If the sector sells a 10 percentage points





Industries (and countries) using more intermediates relative to their output also
contractedmore(Table5,column4).Thisisincontrasttotheassumptionthattheycan
unloadthedemandshockmoreeﬀectively.Onereasoncouldbethattheseindustries
may face diﬀerent demand shocks. This highlights the need to control for demand
shocks, which we do when assess all these eﬀects jointly (Table 5, column 5). The
measuredeﬀectsaresimilartowhentheywereestimatedseparately,buttheeﬀect
ofoutsourcinglosesitsstatisticalsigniﬁcance.
There are diﬀerences in sales changes between ﬁrms in diﬀerent parts of corporate
groups (see Table 6 for the results). We denote as ‘controlling ﬁrms’ those ﬁrms that
haveaﬃliatesoraretheheadofanetwork.Similarly,wecallﬁrmsthataresubordinate
membersofanetwork,orhavebeenacquiredbyanotherﬁrm‘controlledbyothers’.As
anticipated, controlling ﬁrms decline less and controlled ﬁrms decline more, but the
diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Again, the demand shocks facing these
ﬁrmsmaybediﬀerent.





We ﬁrst look at the technological place of the ﬁrm in the input-output table. We have












Observations 14,413 14,413 14,413
Fixedeffects Sector,country,size Sector,country,size Sector,country,size
Model Intervalregression Intervalregression Intervalregression
Source:EFIGE.Notes:Standarderrorsinparantheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
Observationsareweightedbythesamplingweightsoffirms.
The conditional eﬀect of input-output linkages on employment changes, holding the
sales decline ﬁxed, is very small and is not diﬀerent from zero statistically (see
columns 1 through 3 of Table 7). Similarly to what is reported in Table 2, ﬁrms that
suﬀereda0to10percentsalesdropreducedtheiremploymentbyaboutfourtoﬁve
percent.Firmswitha10to30percentsalesdropreducedemploymentbyaboutnine
percent. Firms with greater than 30 percent sales drop laid oﬀ 17 percent of their
workers.
Firmsthataretheheadofanetworkorotherwisehavecontroloverothercompanies,
do not reduce their employment by as much (a positive coeﬃcient means a greater
increase or a lesser reduction – see column 4 of Table 7). For a given level of sales
decline, controlling ﬁrms layoﬀ 1.5 percentage points fewer workers. This may be
becausetheycanbettershieldtheirworkersbyreducingorderstoaﬃliatesinstead.
This interpretation is consistent with the estimate which shows that ﬁrms that are


















Reductioninsalesup-4.656*** -4.654*** -4.653*** -4.652*** -4.65*** -4.647***
to10% (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296
Reductioninsalesup -8.955*** -8.948*** -8.951*** -8.969*** -8.947*** -8.964***
to10-30% (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
Reductioninsales -17.081*** -17.074*** -17.076*** -17.055*** -17.072*** -17.049***
morethan30% (0.475) (0.475) (0.475) (0.474) (0.475) (0.474)
Observations 13,901 13,901 13,901 13,901 13,901 13,901
R2 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.208 0.207 0.208
Fixedeffects Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector,
country,size country,size country,size country,size country,size country,size
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Source:EFIGE.Notes:Standarderrorsinparantheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
Observationsareweightedbythesamplingweightsoffirms.
If ﬁrms respond to demand shocks diﬀerently based on their position within the
companynetwork,thenweexpecttheemploymentdiﬀerencebetweencontrolledand
controlling ﬁrms to be greatest when the demand shock is large. Figure 7 plots the









Fact 4b – Firms that control other companies have reduced their employment


















an important role during the crisis. Drying liquidity in major ﬁnancial markets was
imminent,butitseﬀectonthecorporatesectorrequiresin-depthexamination.Welook
attheeﬀectofexternalﬁnanceonsalesandexportsduringthecrisis,andinvestigate
the role of the maturity composition of external ﬁnance. Tangible assets that can be
usedascollateralhaveapositiveimpactonaccesstoexternalﬁnanceinnormaltimes.





that sub-Saharan countries are more sensitive to partner-country crisis than most developed countries, and
externalﬁnance,especiallytradecredit,doesmatter.EFIGEREPORTIIIFINANCIAlCoNSTrAINTS
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average, 34 percent of ﬁrms answered ‘yes’. The share of constrained ﬁrms was
greatestinSpain(54percent)andFrance(49percent).Thisvariablehasasigniﬁcant,




extent. Our estimates provide evidence for a negative relationship between external
















Allfirms Allfirms Allfirms Allfirms
Firmperceivedfinancial -1.261*** -1.47*** -1.921**
constraints (0.408) (0.41) (0.784)
Firmrecurringtoexternal -1.19*** -1.199*** 0.015





Constant 9.9*** 11.949*** 1.525 3.556
(1.527) (1.414) (2.747) (2.85)
Observations 11,604 11,604 7,523 6,199
R2 0.043 0.047
McKelvey-ZavoinaR2 0.079 0.076
Dummies Sector, Sector, Sector,c Sector,
country,size country,size country,size country,size







































































The survey includes a number of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc questions about ﬁnancing in






This is true when all variables are used (columns 1 and 3) and also true when
comparingﬁrmsthatuseonlylocalbankswithothers(column2).Itisnotonlytrueat
the domestic level, but also true for foreign operations of exporters; exports fell by
over2percentforﬁrmswithlocal-bankﬁnance.Thissuggeststhatcrisistransmission
to manufacturing ﬁrms did not really come through major international banks, but
























Constant 10.602*** 10.074*** 7.364***
(1.457) (1.438) (1.681)
Observations 14285 14314 9,545
McKelvey-ZavoinaR2 0.0807 0.0801 0.0710
Dummies Sector,country,size Sector,country,size Sector,country,size




In summary, our results indicate that ﬁnancing opportunities mattered for ﬁrms
attemptingtocopewiththecrisis.Anumberofﬁrmsreportedthepresenceofﬁnancial




Governments reacted swiftly to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and relaxed budgets sub-
stantially. As well as letting automatic stabilisers go to work, public procurement
programmes were extended. According to OECD (2010), infrastructure spending in




Evidence of the impact of various ﬁscal measures on ﬁrm performance is not widely
available, as most research has either focused on the crisis from a macro-economic











billion. In Spain the package of diﬀerent measures totalled ᾬ4.1 billion with cash-
for-clunkersofᾬ100million.IntheUKᾬ2.3billionincreditwasgrantedtosuppliers
and car producers to support investments in environmentally friendly car
production. More than half of this sum came from the European Investment Bank.
The cash-for-clunkers programme was in the order of ᾬ120 million. In Italy the





During the Great Recession, state involvement in crisis management was rather
widespread in OECD countries as governments reacted to the sharp GDP declines
experiencedin2009.GDPfellby2-7percentinmostEUcountries,withsomecountries
such as Greece, Ireland and Latvia experiencing a drop of 10-20 percent of GDP.
Governments reacted with unprecedented ﬁscal relaxation to save their economies
fromcollapse.AsshowninFigure8,thelargestexpansionwascarriedoutinGermany
andtheUKfollowedbyAustria.Signiﬁcantlysmallerrelativeamountswerecommitted
in France, Italy and Spain, while Hungary enacted no ﬁscal stimulus and actually















Our results may capture the broad evidence of diﬀerences between countries only.
Theyareobtainedbyrelatingﬁrm-levelsaleswithasetofcountry,industryandsize
dummies and the interactions of country dummies with the exporter dummy (see
Table 12). Note that Austria is the base category. These results suggest the largest
country eﬀects in Italy, Hungary and Spain, while the largest deviation of exporting



















may include national or local government and other state-owned institutions. Firms




Fact 6a – Fiscal policy may help to mitigate the eﬀects of crises on ﬁrms, while
home-brewedcrises(suchasinhungaryandSpain)willsubstantiallyreducesales.EFIGEREPORTIIIFISCAlPolICy
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12. Coeﬃcients are calculated from individual country regressions including industry and size dummies as well as
severalothercontrolsrelatingtocompetitionandclients.Resultsareavailableonrequest.
Interestingly for ﬁve of the seven countries, the estimated coeﬃcient does not vary
greatly,rangingbetween5.8percentand7.5percent.However,fortheUKandHungary,






Another possible eﬀect of government orders on ﬁrms is that they may come with
strings attached, probably forcing ﬁrms to lay oﬀ fewer workers. To check this









Fullsample Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK
Intra-groupclients 0.478 1.976 -0.023 -0.608 -1.685 1.682 3.257* 1.735
dummy (0.601) (2.750) (1.119) (1.184) (2.938) (1.643) (1.696) (1.480)
Publicadministration 5.625*** 7.222** 5.795*** 6.272*** 1.578 7.508*** 6.66*** 2.062*
clientsdummy (0.519) (2.892) (0.826) (1.186) (3.177) (1.427) (1.349) (1.151)
Outsourceproduction 1.945** -6.570 0.912 1.550 1.039 2.183 4.473 4.402*
dummy (0.961) (5.025) (1.691) (2.199) (7.958) (1.918) (3.314) (2.598)
Shareofproduction -0.025*** -0.082** -0.026* -0.035*** 0.034 -0.018 -0.002 -0.037**
toorder (0.006) (0.034) (0.016) (0.010) (0.041) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Shareifimported 0.017* 0.034 0.018 0.002 0.067* 0.004 0.049** 0.025
intermediates (0.010) (0.050) (0.016) (0.024) (0.037) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032)
Competitorsfrom -1.381*** -6.831** 0.210 -2.928*** 0.459 -1.243 -0.346 -1.989*
EUdummy (0.422) (2.718) (0.875) (0.915) (2.290) (0.902) (1.041) (1.188)
Exporter(dummy) -1.569*** -8.986*** -2.811*** -4.563*** -0.888 -0.604 1.087 0.834
(0.413) (3.454) (0.868) (0.862) (2.329) (0.912) (0.995) (1.173)
Constant 10.167*** 22.792*** 4.736*** 9.918*** -6.412 6.875*** -3.539 9.253***
(1.686) (5.826) (1.550) (1.257) (4.752) (2.064) (1.727) (2.621)
LnSigma 2.903*** 2.654*** 2.837*** 2.895*** 2.904*** 2.899*** 2.903*** 2.923***
(0.010) (0.069) (0.022) (0.022) (0.052) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
Observations 12.804 248 2.537 2.894 449 2.819 2.204 1.653
McKelvey-ZavoinaR2 0.086 0.191 0.097 0.098 0.059 0.077 0.093 0.055
Dummies Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector, Sector,
size,country size size size size size size size








in terms of how they responded to the crisis. While the typical ﬁrm experienced
declining sales and had to shed workers, this was by no means ubiquitous. Policy-
makerscanlearnfromstudyingtheexperienceofﬁrmsthatwererelativelysuccessful
inweatheringthecrisis.
This heterogeneity also suggests that one-size-ﬁts-all policies might be ineﬀective.








labour during the crisis. As companies tend to retain their core employees, policy
shouldhelpreallocateandretraintheothers.
Regardingtheroleofexports,ourevidenceisinlinewithearlierﬁndings;exportsfell
more than sales in most countries. Reducing imports and relying on outsourcing
oﬀered ﬂexibility that helped mitigate the crisis and helped maintain sales and






more success maintaining their sales. Making speciﬁc products ordered by large
customers may result in greater sales reductions. Similarly, relying on a network ofsuppliers could also mitigate the eﬀect of the crisis. Finally, ﬁrms controlling other
companies at home or abroad could preserve more jobs. This suggests that in such
crises, policy should focus on helping stabilise ﬁrms that are in weaker positions,
ownedbyforeignﬁrmsandproducinglessskill-intensiveand/orspeciﬁcproductsfor
largecustomers.
This raises an important policy trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, while export-oriented




The ﬂip side of the same trade-oﬀ is that outsourcing to other countries has distinct
stabilisationbeneﬁts.Whilemanyseecompetitionbylower-wagecountriesasathreat,
it should also be clear that these supply chain linkages give greater ﬂexibility when
responding to a demand shock. These additional gains from trade for rich countries
implythatprotectionistinstinctsduringthecrisismaybemisguided.
Anecdotalevidencesuggestedthatasbankscollapsed,tradecreditdriedupandhence
exports fell more sharply than output. Yet, earlier studies found mixed evidence
regardingtheeﬀectoftradeﬁnance.Thisreportfallsinlinewithotherpapers,ﬁnding
no convincing result. As trade credit was not itself a major reason for export decline,
policy should consider a broader set of ﬁnancing options. However, we can conﬁrm
the importance of pre-crisis external constraints, and add that a greater reliance on
externalﬁnancehadanegativeimpactonsalesduringthecrisis.Itwasdetectedthat






government purchases from the private sector, evidence on the role of the state is
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in previous years. It contains a rich section on internationalisation as well as
organisation of the ﬁrm, labour and ﬁnance. Crisis indicator variables were asked
directly,suchashowdidsalesorexportchangein2009comparedwith2008.





















– in several cases, dummy variables on a given activity were modiﬁed by imputing










size categories, sampling weights were constructed in terms of size-sector cells to





















































































Total 14,729 100% -12.3%
Changeofexportvolumein Observations Share Conditionalmean
2009vs2008 increase/decrease
Increased 1,456 18.9% 23.6%
Nochange 2,240 29.0%
Reduced 4,028 52.2% -30.8%
Total 7,724 100.00% -11.6%
Changeoflabourin Observations Share Conditionalmean
2009vs2008 increase/decrease
increased 1,905 13.4% 11.9%
nochange 5,778 40.6%
reduced 6,561 46.1% -16.9%

















a rich section on internationalisation as well as organisation of the ﬁrm, labour and
ﬁnance.
Several indicators directly related to the crisis had been asked directly. One such
question, central to this study was ‘How did sales change in 2009 compared with
2008?‘.Similarquestionswereaskedonexportsandemployment,too.
The sample includes around 3,000 ﬁrms from each of France, Italy and Spain, more
than 2,200 from each of Germany and the UK, and 500 from each of Austria and
Hungary. In Appendix A we provide a description of the variables, and document the
distributionofthesamplebysectorandsizeclassforeachcountry.
Whentestingthehypotheseswerelyonanumberofdescriptivestatisticsaswellas
on two types of regressions. The ﬁrst type of regression investigates the variables




The second regression model investigates how diﬀerently ﬁrms reacted in terms of
their employment assuming a similar sized demand shock. For example, we
considered if some ﬁrms were less likely to lay oﬀ workers, conditioning on sales
decline. For example, the positive coeﬃcient of white collar workers in a regression,
when adjusting for diﬀerences in the demand shock suggests that ﬁrms employing
moresuchworkerswilltendtolayoﬀfewerworkers.Inallourmodels,everyvariableisspeciﬁedinpercentageterms,rangingbetween-
100 percent and 100 percent, where a 100 percent change indicates doubling of












outcome variable, equalling 0 if sales rose or were unchanged, 1 for small (0-10






The second type of regression investigates which ﬁrms are more likely to lay oﬀ
workers, holding demand shock constant. In this case the dependent variable is
employmentchange,whilewecontrolforsalesdecline(asasetofdummies):
Change in employmenti = Xi ʲ + Diʳ + Siʴ + ʵi
where Si denotes the set of sales change dummies. Fortunately ﬁrms reported




In this report, two types of estimation methods are used, an interval regression for
changeinsalesandlabourandOLSforchangeinexports.
TheEFIGEsurveydidnotincludeexactturnoverdatafor2008-2009.Insteaditasked




Average decline in sales values was estimated using sales intervals (see previous






cut-oﬀ points as they are given by the data collection scheme. Indeed, interval
regression can be deﬁned as an ordered probit with cut points ﬁxed and with co-
eﬃcientsandvarianceestimatedbymaximumlikelihood(Wooldridge,2002,p.509).
TheadvantageisthatestimatescannowbeinterpretedasiftheycamefromanOLS13.
A similar method was applied for change in the labour. Here we used a set of survey
questionstoconstructasimilarsetofvaluesanduseintervalregressionsaswell.
Forchangeinexportvalues,asimpleOLSwasusedwithadependentvariablegiven
as percentage change of exports in 2009 compared to 2008, also constructed from
severalsurveyquestions.
13. Another option would be to provide mid-points directly rather than using ML estimates. Our results are robust to









The estimation of interval models by maximum likelihood, introduced by Stewart
(1983) is relatively straightforward and has been applied in a number of contexts
estimating willingness to pay models. The data generating process for the eﬀect on
crisisisassumedtobe
y*
i = xi ʲ + ʵi
wheresaleschangeisdenotedbyy*
ibutitisnotdirectlyobserved.Insteadwhatwe





cases like 30 percent and above). Once we assume normality, we can compute the
loglikelihoodforanobservation:
Mi − xiʲ mi − xiʲ
li (ʲ,˃) = lnP (mi ≤ y*
i ≤ Mi) = ln[ ʦ(––––––––) −ʦ(––––––––)] ˃ ˃
The likelihood-ratio chi-squared tests the diﬀerence between the full model (with
predictors)andtheconstantonlymodel.TheMcKelvey-ZavoinapseudoR2iscomputed
usingthevariancesofthelatentvariableandthelatentpredictedvariable.Further,we
use a simple correlation between the predicted and observed values as a simple
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What impact has the Great Recession had on European firms? In 2008 and
2009, the European Union experienced a 14 percent decline in industrial
production, and a 15 percent decline in trade. Companies were hit hard, going
through an average 10 percent sales decline, and reducing their workforces
by 6 percent.
But the unique firm-level dataset compiled from the EFIGE survey shows that
not all firms were affected in the same way. Exporters contracted more than
non-exporters, while importers, and those that outsource some of their
production or have an affiliate suffered less of a decline. These findings raise
an important policy trade-off. While export-oriented strategies might improve
competitiveness, they also bring about a greater exposure to foreign crises.
However, outsourcing to other countries has distinct stabilisation benefits.
Dominant firms centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership net-
work, fared better, but firms relying on external finance, and experiencing
financial constraints to growth, experienced greater sales declines.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) is a project to examine the pat-
tern of internationalisation of European firms. The research leading to this
report has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework
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